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[Sac. No. 7742. In Bank. Apr. 21,1967.] 
EUNICE D. CLARK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HAROLD 
M. GIBBONS et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Physicians - Malpractice - Appeal. - To determine whether 
sufficient evidence of negligence was adduced against doctors 
in a malpractice suit, the appellate court's power begins and 
ends with a finding that the record contains some substantial 
evidence, contradicted or not, supporting the jury's conclusion. 
[2] Id.-Malpractice-Appeal.-On appeal by defendants in a 
medical malpractice action, the record must be read in the 
light most advantageous to plaintiff; all conflicts must be 
resolved in her favor; and all legitimate and reasonable infer-
ences must be indulged to uphold the verdict for plaintiff, if 
that is possible. 
[3] Id.-Malpractice-Evidence.-In an action for damage~ result-
ing from surgery that was not completed after the anesthesia 
terminated prematurely, sufficient evidence, independent of the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, supported a verdict against the 
anesthetist where it appeared that anesthetics lasting the 
required time were available but were not used, that the 
anesthetist admitted his responsibility to know the surgeon's 
needs and his failure to inquire how long the surgeon would 
take, that with proper care anesthetics do not usually wear off 
prematurely, that their improper administration can cause 
premature termination, that plaintiff's initial reaction indi-
cated improper administration, and that the anesthetist failed 
to record the premature termination, as he should have done, 
thereby permitting an inference of guilty knowledge regarding 
the tennina tion. 
[41" 4b] Id.-Malpractice-Evidence.-In an action to recover for 
. injury resulting from surgical reduction of a trimalleolar 
fracture of plaintiff's ankle, sufficient evidence, independent of 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, supported a verdict against the 
surgeon where it was shown that he became upset when the 
anesthesia began to wear off prematurely and terminated the 
surgery without consulting the anesthetist as to the possibility 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Physicians and Surgeons, § 61; [3, 
4] Physicians and Surgeons, § 56(3); [5] Physicians and Sur-
geons, § 57; [6] Negligence, § 133(5); [7] Negligence, § 134; [8] 
Negligence, § 139; Physicians and Surgeons, § 57; [9, 12] Physi-
cians and Surgeons, § 56; [10] Negligence, § 135(5); [11] Negli-
gence, § 135(4); [13] Negligence, §§ 198(2), 202; Physicians and 
Surgeons, § 59. 
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of extending the anesthesia, though the surgeon admitted that 
healing of the skin at the nonnal rate did not permit a second 
operation within the necessary time, that lle had the duty to 
speak to the anesthetist if the operation were going to be 
unusually long, that he required more time than he usually did 
for such surgery, that the fracture was one of the most severe 
he had ever seen, and that he did not advise the anesthetist 
that additional time would be needed. 
[6] Id.-Malpractice-Jury Questions.-In a malpractice action 
involving injuries following the premature termination of 
anesthesia during surgery, though the anesthetist testified that 
inadequate anesthesia could have resulted from several unpre-
dictable causes and that he used due care in administering the 
anesthetic, the credibility of his testimony was properly left 
to the jury. 
[6] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Oonditions for Application.-
Generally, res ipsa loquitur applies where the occurrence of an 
injury is of such a nature that, in the light of past experience, 
it probably resulted from soneone's negligence and that 
defendant is probably the one responsible. 
[7] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Basis for Rule.-The res ipsa loqui-
tur doctrine is fundamentally predicated on inferences dedu-
cible from circumstantial evidence and the weight to be given 
them .. 
[8] Id. - Res Ipsa Loquitur - Effect on Burden of Proof: Physi-
cians-Malpractice-Jury Questions.-Under conditions giving 
rise to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine when medical personnel, 
acting in concert, collectively have access to the chief evidence 
as to the cause of injury but plaintiff does not, an individual 
doctor, to avoid the inference of negligence as a matter of law, 
must go beyond showing that it was unlikely or improbable he 
was negligent and must establish his freedom from negligence 
by evidence that cannot be rationally disbelieved. Falling short 
of such a showing, it remains for the jury to determine 
whether the inference arising from the doctrine was rebutted 
as to any particular doctor. 
[9] Physicians-Malpractice-Evidence.-In a medical malprac-
tice case, plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the cause of injury 
may exist not only where he is totally unconscious but also 
where he is partially unconscious and largely unaware of what 
medical personnel were doing; and where the chief evidence as 
to the cause of injury is accessible to medical personnel but 
[6] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 307 et seq; Am.Jur., Negligence 
(lst cd § 295 et seq). 
[9] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Physicians, Dentists, and Other Healers of 
the Sick, § 98; Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons (1st ed § 9f» 
.. ) 
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not to plaintiff, his being under a local anesthetic rather than 
a general anesthetic does not eliminate the duty of explanation 
by those who had control over the procedure. 
[10] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur~Occurrence Unlikely With-
out Negligence.-Evidence that an accident rarely occurs when 
due care is used does not, without more, indicate a particular 
occurrence is more likely than not the result of 8Omeone's 
negligence. 
[11] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Probability of Negligence. - The 
likelihood of a negligent cause for injury is increased if the 
low incidence of accidents, when due care is used, is combined 
with proof of specific negligent acts of a type that could have 
caused the injury; when those two facts are proved, the likeli-
hood of a negligent cause may be sufficiently great that a jury 
may properly conclude the accident was more probably than 
not the result of someone's negligence. 
(12] Physicians-Malpractice-Evidence.-In a medical malprac-
tice case, a doctor's negligent act of a type that could have 
caused the accident, which does not ordinarily occur in the 
exercise of due care, greatly increases the probability that his 
negligence caused plaintiff's injuries. 
(18] Negligence-Instructions-Res Ipsa Loquitur: Medical Treat-
ment: Physicians-Malpractice-Instructions.-In an action 
involving injury resulting from surgery not completed after 
the anesthesia terminated prematurely, a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction was proper where there was evidence that an 
anesthetist, using proper care and obtaining proper informa-
tion, could have made the anesthetic last long enough, that the 
surgeon and anesthetist did not consult each other about the 
time needed for the surgery, that plaintiff's injury was caused 
by premature termination of the anesthesia and the surgeon's 
determination to terminate surgery though both doctors were 
aware it should be performed and completed as soon as possi-
ble, and that there was a reasonable method to !landle the 
premature termination of anesthesia when it occurred. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County. Irving H. Perluss, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for medical malpractice. Judgment for plaintiff 
affirmed. 
Peart, Baraty & Hassard, Wilke, Fleury & Sapunor, Rich-
ard G. Logan, Hanna & Brophy, Donald R. Brophy and 
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Jack H. Werchick and Arne Werchick for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
PETERS, J.-Plaintiff Eunice D. Clark brought this action 
against Dr. Selmants, an anesthesiologist, Dr. Gibbons and his 
partner Dr .. Horn, orthopedic surgeons, and Sutter Commu-
nity Hospital of Sacramento for damages for injuries result-
ing from an operation allegedly negligently performed in 
Sutter Community Hospital by Drs. Gibbons and Selmants. 
The jury returned verdicts of $27,500 against all of the 
doctors and exonerated the hospita1.1 Motions for a 'new trial 
were denied, and the doctors have appealed from the 
judgment. 
Defendants' contentions are that the verdicts are not 
supported by sufficient evidence of negligence, and that the 
trial court committed reversible error by giving conditional 
res ipsa' loquitur instructions. Both contentions are 
unsound. 
[1] It must be kept in mind that in determining whether 
sufficient evidence of negligence was adduced against the 
doctors,2 the power of an appellate court begins and ends 
with a finding that the record contains some substantial evi-
dence, .contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports the 
conclusion reached by the jury. [2] The record m;ust be 
read in the light most advantageous to the plaintiff. All 
conflicts must be resolved in her favor; and all legitimate and 
reasonable inferences must be indulged in to uphold the 
verdict, if that is possible. (Orawford v. Southern Pac. 00., 3 
Ca1.2d 427,429 [45 P.2d 183].) 
The record discloses that on October 30, 1960, at approxi-
mately 2 p.m., plaintiff Eunice Clark, who was 41 years old, 
obese and in good health, suffered a fractured right ankle 
when she slipped and fell on a waxed floor in her home. She 
was taken by ambulance to the Sutter Community Hospital. 
and examined by her physician Dr. Smith. After viewing X-
rays of the fracture, Dr. Smith told her that it was a case for 
an orthopedic surgeon. Mrs. Clark requested the services of 
Dr. Gibbons who had previously treated her husband and who 
IThe Jiability of Dr. Hom was predicated upon his partnership with 
Dr. Gibbons. No separate contentions are made as to his liability. It is, 
in effect, admitted that Dr. Horn's liability depends upon that of Dr. 
Gibbons. Plaintiff has not appealed from the judgment in favor of the 
hospital. . 
2Plaintiff did not produce any expert witnesses of her own. For expert 
testimony she relied upon the evidence of the defendants called under 
seetion 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
) 
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happened to be in the hospital at that time. Dr. Gibbons 
determined from viewing the X-rays that plaintiff had a 
severe trimalleolar fracture of tbe right ankle and tlmt an 
open reduction, i.e., reduction by surgery, should be per-
formed as soon as possible. He informed plaintiff that he 
would prefer to operate that night since the ankle would be 
stiff by the next morning. Plaintiff agreed. 
Dr. Selmants, one of the anesthesiologists on the hospital 
staff, undertook to administer the anesthesia. Plaintiff gave 
the doctor a preanesthesia history which revealed that she had 
eaten between 1 and 2 p.m. Dr. Selmants believed that a 
general anesthetic should not be given to one who had eaten in 
the 12 hours preceding surgery, and that a general anesthetic 
was dangerous for a patient who had eaten within six or seven 
hours of surgery. Dr. Selmants concluded that plaintiff was 
not a safe subject for a general anesthetic. He told plaintiff 
that she should be given a spinal anesthetic, and she agreed to 
a spinal, although she said that she would prefer a genera1. 
Dr. Gibbons concurred in the decision to give a spina1. 
Dr. Selmants selected the agent to be used for the spina1. 
He testified that it was the anesthesiolgist's duty to know the 
time required for surgery and that he did not ask Dr. Gibbons 
how long the operation would take, because he knew from 
previously working with Dr. Gibbons that the surgeon aver-
aged two hours for usual reductions of this kind. This case 
was not unusual, he believed, and would accordingly require 
two hours. The agent that Dr. Selmants chose was 10 milli-
grams of pontocaine. It was designed to maintain a level of T-
10 for two hours plus or minus 15 minutes, and it was 
predictable in intensity and duration. 
Dr. Gibbons testified that plaintiff's fracture was severe, 
and that he expected the operation to take from two to three 
hours. The anesthesiologist said that the anesthesia he selected 
could not be used unmodified for surgery of from two and a 
half to three hours, but that by adding epinephine to the 
pontoca.ine, he could have produced an agent with a predicta-
ble duration of over four and a half hours. 
Prior to surgery plaintiff was nervous and anxious. She was 
not more upset however than any person with an ankle injury 
and she was calmed by injections of vistaril and nembutal and 
taken into surgery at approximately 8 p.m. 
Dr. Selmants then administered the spinal anesthetic and 
made pinprick tests to assure that the proper level of anes-
thesia had been achieved. After the anesthesia was injected 
) 
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and the numbness started up her legs, plaintiff felt that she 
could not breathe amI her voice became squeaky. Dr. Selmants 
stated that a patient should not suffer from shortness of 
breath at a level of T-IO, and that plaintiff's difficulty in 
breathing could have been "some undue effect (from] the way 
the anesthetic' was given." 
When the anesthesia reached the level necessary for 
surgery, Dr. Gibbons commenced the operation. The level of 
anesthesia remained adequate at first; but after about one 
hour the doctors noticed from plaintiff's unconscious move-
ments that the anesthesia was beginning to wear off. At this 
point Dr. Gibbons had completed all of the reduction except 
for reduction of the posterior fragment of the tibia. Dr. Sel-
mants believed that 20 minutes more were needed to complete 
the operation, but Dr. Gibbons testified that no less than 
another hour would have been required. 
Dr. Selmants could have extended the surgical anesthesia 
without harm to the patient. He stated that intravenous 
demerol could have been used for that purpose and that there 
was no particular reason not to use it, although the extension 
obtained might still have been insufficient to complete the 
operation. Also, another spinal could have been given. Dr. 
Gibbons 'stated that he did not think that plaintiff "would 
have been up to" another spinal and that in turning her for 
the spinal all the preppi.ng and draping would have to be 
undone and this might subject her to a risk of infection. 
In any event, the operation was terminated, the incision 
was closed, and a cast was applied to plaintiff's ankle in an . 
attempt to reduce the posterior fragment by external pressure. 
Dr. Gibbons' operative report mentioned that the operation 
was not completed because the anesthetic did not last for the 
required length of time. Dr. Selmants failed to note those 
facts, although he was supposed to make an accurate report of 
how the anesthesia proceeded with relation to the needs of the 
operation. 
The decision to terminate surgery was made primarily by 
Dr. Gibbons. He was in control of the surgery and could have 
asked for an extension of the anesthesia. He had stated in his 
deposition that he became upset when the anesthesia began to 
wear off and that he did not consult with Dr. Selmants about 
extending the anesthesia but just said "I think we will quit 
for tonight and do this another time." At the trial, however, 
both he and Dr. Selmants testified that they discussed the 
question whether the anesthesia should be continued or the 
) 
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operation terminated and that Dr. Selmants agreed with the 
decision to terminate. 
Dr. Gibbons testified that, when he made the decision to 
terminate, he expected to complete the operation later, but did 
not do so because blebs, infected blisters of the skin, devel-
oped; that it was very common for blebs to accompany an 
injury of this nature, that plaintiff's blebs healed at tll(' 
normal rate, but that healing of blebs at the normal rate did 
not permit a second operation within the time when a second 
operation would have been of any value. 
Three days after the operation Dr. Gibbons noticed tllat the 
posterior fragment had slipped back to some extent and that 
another open reduction was required. A second operation 
could not be performed, however, because pressure and resu]-
tant swelling, as pointed out, had caused blebs, which pre-
sent.ed a serious risk of infection if the skin were cut. 
Dr. Gibbons charged plaintiff less than the normal operat-
ing fee because his operation was unsuccessful. She now 
suffers from osteoarthritis in the ankle joint, which is painful. 
The arthritis might have resulted from the fracture even if a 
perfect union had been achieved. However, there is expert 
testimony that the chances of getting arthritis were increase(l 
by the failure to achieve a complete reduction; and the 
defendants do not claim that the evidence is insufficient to 
show that the arthritis was due, at least in part, to the failure 
to complete the operation. 
Nothing but a fusion, which would impair the ankle's up 
and down movement, could now give plaintiff a pain free 
ankle. Dr. Gibbons' partner, Dr. Horn, offered to fuse the 
ankle for a token fee of $100. 
Plaintiff's position is that the jury received sufficient evi-
dence to find that the imperfect reduction causing the present 
injury was the result of (1) the negligence of Dr. Selmants in 
selecting and administering an anesthetic which wore off 
before the operation was completed and (2) the negligence of 
Dr. Gipbons in (a) not informing Dr. Selmants that the oper-
ation might well take longer than the two hours which Sel-
mants expected the operation to take and (b) terminating the 
operation prematurely rather than ordering an extension of 
the anesthesia. 
The evidence upon which plaintiff primarily relies to show 
negligence in the selection or administration of the anesthetic 
is the following testimony of Dr. Selmants: "Q .... if 
proper care is used, in the usual course of events, anesthetics 
I 
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like this don't run out or wear out, do they-surgical anes-
thetics T A. No, sir. 
And I said' no, sir.' What I mean is, they can. There is no 
control. There is-there is-there is a variable, as anything 
else we do in medicine. There is nothing exact that guarantees 
this will happen, this will not happen, how long this will last. 
You cannot ever predicate what you're doing on the basis 
that it's going to be 100 percent; you have a certain area of 
predictability, and that's what you go on. Q. Now, my ques-
tion was-you see, you misunderstood. I'll say it again. My 
question was, if proper care is used in a situation like this, 
anesthetics like this usually do not run out, do they T A. Yes, 
usually they do not run out." Dr. Gibbons stated in his 
deposition that if the anesthesiologist uses proper care and 
obtains proper information about the case, he can make a 
spinal anesthesia last long enough for an operation of this 
kind. -
Later in direct examination Dr. Selmants and Dr. Horn 
testified that it is common knowledge in the field of anesthesia 
that there is always an inherent risk that, even when due care 
is used, a spinal anesthesia will not last as long as contem-
plated. Dr. Selmants explained that immediately upon the 
injection of any spinal anesthetizing agent a process of detoxi-
fication commences within the area of the nerve root blockage 
which ultimately causes the anesthesia to wear off. The speed 
of detoxification in any individual depends primarily upon 
the amount of circulation in the nerve area and the amount of 
myelin covering the nerve itself. 
[3,4a] The evidence, independently of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur, is sufficient to support the verdict against both 
doctors. So far as Dr. Selmants is concerned, while the evi-
dence shows that he and Dr. Gibbons were not negligent in 
making the initial decision to give a spinal rather than a 
general anesthetic,S there is evidence that Dr. Selmants was 
negligent in selecting the agent to be used for the spinal. The 
orthopedic surgeon expected the operation would take from 
two to three hours to complete. Anesthetics were available 
that would have lasted at least that long without undue 
danger to the patient. Dr. Selmants did not use those anes-
SEven it the jury could tind that a spinal was not absolutely necessary 
for the plaintiff's safety, there is no ('vidence that a general was neces-
sarily preterable in this rase. The mere giving of a spinal whenever the 
patient is experiencing the normal agitation due to an injury is certainly 
not sufficient to constitute negligence. 
Apr. 1967] CLARK tJ. GmBONS 
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thetics because he did not expect that the operation would 
take as long as three hours. Dr. Selmants admitted, however, 
that it was his responsibility to know the needs of the surgeon 
and that he did not inquire how long the surgeon would take 
in this case. Because he underestimated the probable length of 
the operation, he gave an anesthetic which was designed to 
last a maximum of two hours and 15 minutes and a minimum 
of one hour and 45 minutes. The jury could have found that 
this choice of anesthetic was negligent. 
In addition, Dr. Selmants testified that anesthetics do not 
usually wear off prematurely if proper care is used. Prema-
ture termination can be caused by improper administration of 
the agent, and plaintiff's initial reaction to the injection, 11er 
squeaky voice and difficulty in breathing, is evidence that the 
anesthetic was improperly administered. Dr. Selmants failed 
to note the premature termination in his records relating to 
the progress of the anesthesia, as he should have done .. The 
jury could infer from such omission that he possessed some 
guilty knowledge regarding the termination. From the symp-
toms of improper administration and the inference of guilty 
knowledge, the jury could properly imply that Dr. Selmants' 
had administered the anesthetic improperly. 
[6] Although Dr. Selmants testified that inadequate anes-
thesia could have resulted from several unpredictable causes 
and that he used due care in the administration of the anes-
thetic, the credibility of this testimony was properly left to 
the jury. 
[4b] There is also sufficient evidence of negligence to 
support the verdict against Dr. Gibbons. Dr. Gibbons could 
have been found responsible for the improper selection of an 
anesthetic. Although the anesthesiologist ordinarily has the 
duty to ask the surgeon about the projected length of the 
operation, Dr. Selmants testified that the surgeon should 
speak to the anesthesiologist if the operation is going to be 
unusually long. Dr. Selmants testified that Dr. Gibbons aver-
aged two hours in operating on trimalleolar ankle fractures . 
. Dr. Gibbons testified that Mrs. Clark's fracture was one of 
the most severe trimalleolars he had ever seen. Under those 
circumstances the jury could find that Dr. Gibbons expected 
an unusually long operation and was under a duty to warn' 
Dr. Selmants of the need for an anesthetic that would last 
more than two hours. 
Dr. Gibbons stated in his deposition that he became upset 
when the anesthesia began to wear off and, without consulting 
I 
, , 
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Dr. Selmants about the possibility of extending the anes-
t hesia, said that the surgery would be terminated now and 
(:olllpleted at a later time. Hc also admitted that healing of 
the skin at the normal rate did not permit a second operation 
to be performed within the necessary time. 
Thus, from Dr. Gibbons' own statements, the jury could 
have found that in making the decision to terminate he acted 
rashly knowing the dangers, but without considering the 
possibility of extending the anesthesia and under the errone-
ous belief that the completion of the reduction could be 
accomplished by a second operation. Both the possibility of 
extending anesthesia and the possibility of further surgery 
are clearly major factors which should have been considered 
by a surgeon confronted with inadequate anesthesia. Under 
these circumstances, the jury could conclude without any 
other expert testimony that in making the decision to termi-
nate surgery, Dr. Gibbons did not exercise that care and skill 
ordinarily practiced by other specialists in orthopedic surgery 
under similar circumstances." 
In addition, the facts of this case warrant the use of the 
conditional res ipsa loquitur instructions. [6] As a general 
rule, res ipsa loquitur applies where the occurrence of the 
injury i,s of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of 
past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence 
by someone and that the defendant is probably the person 
who is responsible. In determining whether such probabilities 
exist with regard to a particular occurrence, the courts have 
relied both on common knowledge and on expert testimony. 
(Davis v. Memorial Hospital, 58 Ca1.2d 815, 817 [26 Cal. Rptr. 
633, 376 P.2d 561] ; Siverson v. Weber, 57 Ca1.2d 834, 836 [22 
Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97].) 
"This court has held in one case that since a physician normally under· 
takes to exercise only that care and skill common to the profession and 
that since some mistakes are inherent in this exercise, proof of mistaken 
diagnosis or wrong method of treatment in itself is not sufficient to show 
lack of skill and care. (Patterson v. Marcus, 203 Cal. 550, 552-553 [265 
P. 222].) However, as noted by Prosser, "Such decisions, together with 
the notorious unwillingness of members of the medical profession to tes-
tify against one another, may impose an insuperable handicap upon a 
plaintiff who cannot obtain the proof." (Prosser on Torts (3d ed. 1964) 
§ 39, p. 231.) Each case must be determined on its own facts, and at least 
where, as here, there is evidence not only of improper treatment, but of 
the doctor's agitation and total failure to consider the alternative meth-
ods of treatment and their consequences, a jury is competont to find with-
out the conclusion of an expert that the doctor did not exercise that 
degree of care and skill common to other specialists in the community. 
(Cf. Quintal v. Laurel Gr01J~ Hospital, 62 Ca1.2d 154, 161 [41 Cal.Rptr. 
577,397 P.2d 161].) 
) 
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[7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine funda-
mentally predicated upon inferences deducible from circum-
stantial evidence and the weight to be given to them. (Quintal 
v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra~ 62 Ca1.2d 154, 163.) As 
stated in Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Ca1.2d 681, 686-687 [39 Cal. 
Rptr. 881,394 P.2d 697] : 
"One of the frequently quoted statements of the applicable 
rules is to be found in the opinion of Chief Justice ErIe in 
Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H. & C. 
596, quoted in Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 1955) section 42, at 
page 201, as follows: 'There must be reasonable evidence of 
negligence; but where the thing is shown to be under the 
management of the defendant or his servants, and the acci-
dent is such as in the ordinary course of things does not 
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it 
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by 
the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. ' 
, 'Of course, negligence and connecting defendant with it, 
like other facts, can be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
There does not have to be an eyewitness, nor need there be 
pirect evidence of defendant's conduct. There is no absolute 
t-equirement that the plaintiff explain how the accident 
happened. Res ipsa loquitur may apply where the cause of the 
injury is a mystery, if there is a reasonable and logical infer-
ence that defendant was negligent, and that such negligence 
caused the injury. (Prosser on Torts, supra, at p. 204.)" 
(See also Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 
154, 164-165.) 
More than 20 years ago in Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Ca1.2d 
486, 489 et seq. [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258], this court 
had occasion to consider the application of the doctrine to 
cases where injury was received by a medical patient while 
unconscious under the influence of anesthesia. It was 
stated: 
"There is, however, some uncertainty as to the extent to 
which res ipsa loquitur may be invoked in cases of injury 
from medical treatment. This is in part due to the tendency, 
in some decisions, to lay undue emphasis on the limitations of 
the doctrine, and to give too little attention to its basic under-
lying purpose. The result has been that a simple, under-
standable rule of circumstantial evidence, with a sound 
background of common sense and human experience, has 
occasionally been transformed into a rigid legal formula, 
which arbitrarily precludes its application in many cases 
) 
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where it is most important that it should be applied. If the 
doctrine is to continue to serve a useful purpose, we should 
not forget that' the particular force and justice of the rule, 
regarded as a presumption throwing upon the party charged 
the duty of producing evidence, consists in the circumstance 
that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or 
innocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to 
the injured person.' . . . 
" ... [I]t is difficult to see how the doctrine can, with any 
justification, be so restricted in its statement as to become 
inapplicable to a patient who submits himself to the care and 
custody of doctors and nurses, is rendered unconscious, and 
receives some injury from instrumentalities used in his treat-
ment. Without the aid of the doctrine a patient who received 
permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result 
of someone's negligence, would be entirely unable to recover 
unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose 
to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts 
establishing liability. (See Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 
251 [7 P.2d 228].) If this were the state of the law of negli-
gence, the courts, to avoid gross injustice, would be forced to 
invoke the principles of absolute liability, irrespective of 
negligence,. in actions by persons suffering injuries during the 
course of treatment under anesthesia. But we think this junc-
ture has not yet been reached, and that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquit.ur is properly applicable to the case before us." 
(Ybm'ra v. Spangard, supra, 25 Ca1.2d 486, 489-491.) 
In Ybarra, it was pointed out that in a modern hospital a 
patient is quite likely to come under the care of a number of 
persons in different types of contractual relationships with 
each other, including physicians and surgeons, anesthetists, 
and nurses; that every defendant in whose custody the plain-
tiff was placed for any period was bound to exercise ordinary 
care to see that no unnecessary harm came to the plaintiff; 
that, although at the trial some of the defendants might be 
found liable and others absolved, this would not preclude 
application of the doctrine; and that, since each of the 
defendants in acting together to provide the medical treat-
ment at one time or another was in control of the various 
agencies which might have harmed plaintiff, they should have 
the burden of initial explanation. (25 Cal.2d at pp. 491-
492.) 
Ybarra involved an injury which may not have been 
received during the operation, but Leonard v. Watsonville 
~. 
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Community Hospital, 47 Ca1.2d 509, 514 et seq. [305 P.2d 36], 
involved an injury during the operation and followed Ybarra 
in holding that where the conditions of the doctrine are satis-
fied all persons who had any control over the patient 's b~dy 
or the instrumentalities causing injury may properly be called 
upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an 
explanation of their conduct. In Leonard it was further held 
that the inference of negligence arising under the doctrine is 
dispelled as a matter of law with regard to a particular doctor 
only where other evidence establishes as a matter of law that 
he is free from negligence. The evidence establishing the 
· absence of negligence in such a case must be clear, positive, 
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot be 
· rationally disbelieved. 
Ybarra and Leonard establish that, if the conditions giving 
rise to the doctrine are present when the medical personnel 
are treated as a group acting in. concert and they collectively 
have access to the chief evidence as to the cause of the injury 
· but the plaintiff does not, a single doctor may not escape the 
inference as a matter of law merely by showing that as to him 
alone it is more probable than not that he was free from fault. 
The basis of the application of the doctrine to all defendants 
in the cases is that the medical personnel acted as a group and 
that collectively, without regard to what anyone may indi-
vidually know, or did, they are in a position to explain the 
cause and produce the chief evidence bearing on the question 
whereas the plaintiff is not. [8] To avoid the inference as a 
tnatter of law an individual doctor must go beyond showing 
that it was unlikely or not probable he was negligent and 
must establish that he is free from negligence by evidence 
which cannot be rationally disbelieved. Falling short of such a 
showing, it remains for the jury to determine whether the 
inference arising from the doctrine has been rebutted as to 
any particular doctor. 
[9] The fact that the patient may have received a local 
anesthetic rather than a general anesthetic does not eliminate 
the duty of explanation of those who had control over the 
procedure where the chief evidence as to the cause is accessi-
ble to them but not to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's lack of 
knowledge may exist not only where he is totally unconscious 
but also where he is partially unconscious and largely, if not 
entirely, unaware of what the medical personnel are doing. 
The conditions giving rise to the doctrine here existed. This 
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Hospital, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 154, a case involving injuries 
during an operation. There the plaintiff suffered a cardiac 
arrest during the administration of a general anesthetic, and 
it was held that an instruction on conditional res ipsa loqui-
tur was proper even though the medical experts testified that 
a cardiac arrest, although a rare occurrence, is a known and 
calculated risk in the giving of a general anesthetic and 
though there was no expert testimony that when cardiac 
arrests do occur, they are more likely than not the result of 
negligence. There was evidence that a method of meeting the 
unusual risk existed. Experts testified that when due care is 
used, cardiac arrests do not ordinarily occur, and, in addition, 
evidence was presented of fever and apprehension of the 
patient before administration of the anesthetic which tended 
to show that the cardiac arrest in that case was caused by 
negligence 0.£ the doctors. 
Thus, we recognized in Quintal that proof that when due 
care is exercised an injury rarely occUrs, accompanied by 
other evidence indicating negligence, may be sufficient to 
warrant an instruction on conditional res ipsa loquitur. (See 
also Ragusano v. Civic Center Hospital Ji'oundation, 199 
CaI.App.2d 586, 593-594 [19 CaI.Rptr. 118].) This is particu-
larly true where, as in Quintal and in the present case, the· 
injury occurred as the result of a normal procedure such as 
the administration! of an anesthetic, rather than from a 
complex operation. 
[10] It is true that evidence that an accident rarely occurs 
when due care is used does not without more indicate that a 
particular occurrence is more likely tha~ not the result of 
someone's negligence. (Siverson v. Weber, supra, 57 Cal.2d 
834,839.) In Siverson it was stated: 
, 'To permit an inference of negligence under the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur solely because an uncommon complication 
develops would place too great a burden upon the medical 
profession and might result in an undesirable limitation on 
the use of operations or new procedures involving an inherent 
risk of injury even when due care is used. Where risks are 
inherent in an operation and an injury of a type which is rare 
does occur, the doctrine should not be applicable unless it can 
be said that, in the light of past experience, such an occur-
rence is more likely the result of negligence than some cause 
for which the defendant is not responsible." (57 CaI.2d at p. 
839.) But in Siverson there was no evidence of a negligent act 
of a type that could have caused the accident, and none of the 
-) 
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witnesses "testified that anything was done during the oper-
ation which was contrary to good medical practice." ( 57 
Ca1.2d at pp. 838-839.) The court refused to permit an 
instruction on the doctrine where the only basis for it was 
evidence that the injury suffered by the patient rarely occurs 
as a result of the surgical procedure. 
[11] The likelihood of a negligent cause is increased if the 
low incidence of accidents when due care is used is combined 
with proof of specific acts of negligence of a type which could 
have caused the occurrence complained of. When those two 
facts are proved, the likelihood of a negligent cause may be 
sufficiently great that the jury may properly conclude that the 
accident was more probably than not the result of someone's 
negligence. 
[12] That a doctor has done a negligent act of a typP. that 
could have caused the accident, which does not ordinarily 
occur in the exercise of due ~are, greatly increases the proba-
bility that it was his negligence that caused the plaintiff's 
injury. Thus, the low incidence of accidents when due care is 
used plus negligent conduct of a type which could have 
caused the occurrence may make it probable that the occur-
rence was the result of someone's negligence and that the 
defendant is probably the person who was responsible. Those 
are the requirements for applying res ipsa loquitur. 
The administration of an anesthetic is now a normal and· 
tested procedure. [13] Dr. Selmants stated that one of the 
reasons for selecting pontocaine in the instant case was its 
predictability as to duration. Medical experts testified that 
spinal anesthetics do not usually run out prematurely if 
proper care is used, and in explanation of this conclusion, Dr. 
Selmants stated only that the predictability of such a-ues-
thetics was not 100 percent. Dr. Gibbons stated in his deposi-
tion without qualification that if an anesthesiologist uses 
proper care and obtains proper information about the case, he 
can make a spinal anesthesia last long enough for an oper-
ation of this kind. 
There is evidence that the injury here was caused by the 
anesthesia wearing off prematurely and that Dr. Selrnants was 
responsible for selecting and administering an anesthetic 
which would be adequate for the length of surgery required. 
Dr. Selmants testified that he did not consult with the 
surgeon regarding the length of the operation and that he 
used an anesthetic which, according to the testimony of the 
surgeon, was inadequate for the estimated length of the oper-
) 
) 
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ation. In addition, Dr. Selmants stated that plaintiff's 
unusual reaction to the anesthetic could have been caused by 
"some undue effect the way the anesthetic had been 
given. " 
There is also evidence, as we have seen, from which the 
jury could conclude that Dr. Gibbons in the exercise of due 
care should have advised Dr. Selmants of the anticipated 
extraordinary length of the surgery and that the former acted 
rashly in determining to terminate the surgery. It bears 
emphasis in this connection that the doctors were aware that 
the procedure should be performed and completed as soon as 
possible. 
This evidence, taken as a whole, along with the evidence 
that therc was a reasonable method of handling the risk when 
it occurred is cert.ainly sufficient for the jury to find that the 
injury was. probably the result of negligence of someone and 
that the defendants were probably the persons responsible. 
Accordingly we conclude that it was proper to instruct the 
jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It is not claimed that 
the form of the conditional instructions given was improper. 
The jUdgment is affirmed. 
Mosk, ·J.,.-Burke, J., and Peek, J.,. concurred. 
TOBRINER, J.-I concur in the judgment, but I am 
unable to join either the majorIty opmlOn or the opinion of 
the Chief Justice. I propose here to explain my dissatisfaction 
with the present definition and application of the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur in that limited number of cases in which rare 
and inexplicable accidents occur in the operating room. In 
pursuing thc laudable goal of shifting the losses occasioned by 
such a.ccidents to the parties best able to protect ·against them 
through insurance, we have imposed the onus of negligence 
and malpractice upon capable and dedicated members of the 
medical profession, burdening the law of res ipsa loquitur 
with a sweep that is inaccurate, inefficient, and inequitable. I 
propose a redefinition of the doctrine governing these cases 
which seems to me more candid, more certain, and more 
consistent with our underlying objectives. 
Initially, I set forth my reasons for joining the majority in 
affirming the judgments against both defendants. Given the 
evidence from which thc jury could have found that the 
*Retired Associate JUlttice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
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specific acts and omissions alleged by plaintiff were negligent 
and proximately caused her injury, I am unwilling to assume 
that the verdict against the defendants rested upon the trial 
court '8 instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Although I believe 
that the instruction should not have been given under the 
circumstances of this case, I would hold that the defendants 
waived any right to demand a new trial on that ground when 
they failed to request a special verdict to reveal the theory 
upon which the jury found them liable. (Code Civ.' Proc., 
§ 625.)1 
I cannot agree, however, with the route by which the 
majority reaches its result. As the Chief Justice demonstrates 
in his separate 6pinion herein, neither common knowledge nor 
expert testimony supported an inference in this case that acci-
dents such as befell the plaintiff ordinarily bespeak a negli-
gent cause. 2 To give a res ipsa instruction under such 
IAn appellate court should not disturb a general verdict merely because 
the trial court gave the jury an abstractly correct instruction which the 
facts before it did not warrant, provided that another theory on which 
the case was submitted to the jury finds substantial support in the evi-
dence and is unaffected by errol'. (See Estate of Hellier (1914) 169 Cal. 
77, 83 [145 P. 1008]; Posz v. Burchell (1962) 209 Ca1.App.2d 324, 335· 
337 [25 Ca1.Rptr. 896], and cases there cited; see also Tucker v. Landllcci 
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 762, 766 [22 Cal.Rptr. 10, 371 P.2d 754]; Gillespie v. 
Rawlings (1957) 49 Ca1.2d 359, 368·369 [317 P.2d 601]; Edwards v. 
Gullick (1931) 213 Cal. 86, 88 [1 P.2d 11]; VerdelZi v. Gray's Harbor 
etc. Co. (1896) 115 Cal. 517, 525 [47 P. 364, 778]; Crosett v. Whelan 
(1872) 44 Cal. 200, 203; Moss v. Coca Cola Bo.ttling Co. (1951) 103 Cal. 
App.2d 380, 384·385 [229 P.2d 802]; Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist. 
(1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 477, 491 [116 P.2d 121] (McComb, J.); Hume v. 
Fresno Irr. Dist. (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 356·357 [69 P.2d 483]; cf. 
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 514, 520 [203 P.2d 522] ; 
Blanton v. Curry (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 793, 799·800 [129 P.2d 1] (per 
curiam); Gerdes v. Pacific Gas g' Electric Co. (1933) 219 Cal. 459, 471· 
473 [27 P.2d 365, 90 A.L.R. 1071]; Christensen v. Malkin (1965) 236 
Cal.App.2d 114, 123 [45 Cal.Rptr. 836]; Rather v. City g- County of San 
Francisco (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 625, 636 [184 P.2d 727].) Although our 
courts have not always taken this approach (see, e.g., Burks v. Blackman 
-(1959) 52 Ca1.2d 715, 719 [344 P.2d 301]; Edwards v. Freeman (1949) 
· 34 Ca1.2d 589, 594 [212 P.2d 883]; Huebotter v. Follett (1946) 27 Ca1.2d 
765, 770·771 [167 P.2d 193]; Oettinger v. Stewart (1944) 24 Ca1.2d 133, 
139·140 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221]; Christensen v. Bocian (1959) 
169 Cal.App.2d 223 [336 P.2d 1018]; Schaffer v. Claremont Country Club 
(1959) 168 Ca1.App.2d 351, 358 [336 P.2d 254, 337 P.2d 139], reh. den. 
168 Cal.App.2d 358·359), consistent adherence to the rule stated herein 
would prevent needless appeals and retrials without injustice to either 
party. 
2Plaintiff adduced expert testimony to show that, when due care is 
used, premature termination of anesthetic is rare. The record contains no 
evidence, however, indicating that in those rare cases in which an anes· 
· the tic does terminate prematurely, a negligent cause is more probable 
• than a non-negligent one. Although plaintiff presented evidence of specific 
l 
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circUlIlBtances invites a purely speculative leap and entrusts 
the jury with unreviewable power to impose or withhold lia-
bility as it sees fit. If public policy demands that defendants be 
held responsible for unexplained accidents without a reasoned 
finding of fault, such responsibility should be fixed openly 
and uniformly, not under the guise of negligence and at the 
discretion of a jury. (Cf. Escola v. Ooca Oola Bottling 00. 
(1944) 24 Cal.2d 453, 463 [150 P.2d 436] (Traynor, J., 
concurring) . ) 
I am likewise disturbed by the conclusion of the Chief 
Justice that the victims of accidents which do not truly 
"speak for themselves" should be required to present evi-
dence that the kinds of accidents they suffered are ordinarily 
caused by negligence. Even if expert medical testimony were 
readily available to plaintiffs in malpractice cases,8 such a 
rule would unfairly penalize the surgical patient who is 
negligent acts which could have caused premature termination, such evi-
dence provided no rational basis for a conclusion that, of the .vanou8 
possible causes, a negligent one was probably responsible. 
The majority asserts: "[I]f the low incidence of accidents when due 
care is used is combined with proof of specific acts of negligence of a 
type which could have caused the occurrence complained of •.•• the jury 
may properly conclude that the accident was more probably than not the 
result of someone's negligence." (A.nte, p. 413.) I cannot agree. 
Suppose, for example, that in 5 percent of all operations in which due 
care is used, a certain spinal anesthetic inevitably terminates prematurely 
because of an undetectable excess of myelin on the patient's nerves; sup-
pose further that a specific technique for administering the anesthetic 
docs not alter the likelihood· of premature termination in patients with an 
excess of myelin but creates a 2 percent risk of premature termination in 
normal patients, whereas another available technique, equally desirable 
in all other relevant respects, creates only a 1 percent risk of prematura 
termination in normal patients. Under these circumstances, the technique 
which creates twice as high a risk in normal patients and yields no com-
pensating benefit would presumahly be considered negligent. 
If one were to examine 100 operations in which this negligent technique 
had been employed, one would expect to find 2 operations in which such 
negligence caused premature termination, compared with 5 in which an 
overabundance of myelin caused premature termination. Yet, in everyone 
of these hypothetical operations, the majority would invite the jury to 
infer a negligent cause without further guidance from the evidence before 
it; I find it disturbing to note that in 5 out of every 7 cases of premature 
termination coupled with a specific negligent act, this inference would _. -
blame the doctor for an accident he did not cause. 
3TIle strong reluctance of doctors to testify against each other has 
frequently been noted (see, e.g., Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 
465, 484 [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d 425] (Carter, J., dissenting); Belli, 
An A.ncient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment (1956) 
1 Vill.L.Rev. 250, 259) and numerous corrective measures have been sug-
gested (see, e.g., Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony (1963) 77 
Harv.L.Rev. 333, 338-350), but the problem apparently remains (see Note. 
Medical Malpractice - E:x:pert Testimony (1966) 60 Nw.U.L.Rev. 834, 
835·837). 
I 
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injured by an accident of a type too rare or too little under-
stood to permit meaningful statistic analysis of its probable 
cause.4 Although I agree with the Chief Justice that the above 
requirement for application of the res ipsa doctrine follows 
from its basic premises, I submit that use of the doctrine itself 
fails to serve the ends of justice in cases such as this. Indeed, 
even the expanded version of res ipsa loquitur espoused by the 
majority falls considerably short of truly protecting the 
victims of unfamiliar and unexplained surgical mishaps, since 
the majority would deny plaintiffs the benefit of a res ipsa 
instruction unless they could produce the kind of testimony 
which the Chief Justice would require, or could persuade a 
medical expert to characterize as substandard the conduct of 
those entrusted with their care. I) 
Upon reexamining what seem to me the grave shortcomings 
of these varying formulations of res ipsa loquitur in surgical 
accident cases, I have concluded that the basic error lies in 
primary reliance upon the concept of negligence and that the 
courts should undertake a fundamental reassessment of the 
largely fictitious and often futile search for fault which 
presently characterizes medical injury litigation of the kind 
here involved. 
At the outset we must recognize that, in the present state of 
medical knowledge, risks which even the most cautious physi-
cian could not have prevented may lead to accidents which 
even the most expert cannot explain. Although the vast 
majority of medical practitioners are protected financially by 
.Since the accidents with which we are here concerned by hypothesis 
occur rarely, there is little hope of obtaining broadly based statistics of 
the sort hypothesized for the computations in footnote 2, 8'Upra. The 
complexity of the concept of negligence as applied to medical techniques, 
coupled with the difficulties of determining the cause of the few accidents 
whieh might be included in any purported sample. render suspect the 
claim of any expert who asserts that in a representative group of eases 
he was able to determine the relative proportion of negligent and non-
negligent causes. 
liThe majority reaffirms the holding of Siverson v. Weber (1962) 57 
Cal.2d 834, 839 [22 Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97], that rarity alone does 
not warrant a conditional res ipsa instruction, and limits the holding of 
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital (1964) 62 Ca1.2d 154, 164-166 [41 Cal. 
Rptr. 577,397 P.2d 161], to cases in which rarity is coupled with "proof 
of specific acts of negligence of a type which could have caused the occur-
rence complained of." (Ante, p. 413.) Plaintiffs who cannot qualify 
under Quintal by obtaining such proof are thus relegated to the basic 
rule of Siverson that res ipsa is applicable only if common knowledge or 
expert witnesses establish that accidents of the sort which befell the 
plaintiff are II more likely the result of negligence than some cause for 
whieh the defendant is not responsible." (57 Ca1.2d at 839.) 
lIc.M-l. 
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liability insurance covering such accidents,6 and although 
doctors and hospitals can readily transfer the cost of this 
insurance protection to their patients through higher medical 
fees, no technique yet devised can protect a doctor from the 
devastating impact which an adjudication of malpractice can 
have upon his professional standing.7 Fearing that his compe-
tence may thus be impugned whenever he adopts a procedure 
difficult to justify to a lay jury, a surgeon may feel compelled 
to forego an unorthodox technique in order to protect his 
reputation from ruin.8 Any system which thus diverts the 
doctor's attention from the operating room to the courtroom 
leaves much to be desired.9 
In light of the expansion of res ipsa loquitur undertaken by 
such decisions as Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra, 62 
Ca1.2d 154, and by the majority opinion in the present case, 
there can be little doubt that the net effect of the doctrine Is 
to shift from plaintiffs to defendants the cost of a certain 
number of unexplainable accidents in which no meaningful 
basis exists for finding the defendants at fault. tO Thus the 
6A 1959 estimate showed that more than 92 percent of American doc-
tors carried professional liability insurance, with an average coverage 
ranging from $25,000 for general practitioners to $100,000 for specialists. 
(Silvernuin, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Saturday Evening Post, April 
25, 1959, pp. 36, 120.) 
7Indeed, many doctors genuinely fear that even if. they win a malprac-
tice case, they will be "all but destroyed professionally." (Shindell, 
Medicine versus Law: A Proposal for Settlement (1953) 151 A.M.A.J. 
1078, 1079.) 
8See Cohn, Medical JJaZpractice Litigation: A Plague on Both H0'U8es 
(1966) 52 A.B.A.J. 32; McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practi· 
tioners (1959) 12 Vand.L.Rev. 549, 608; Silverman, ope cit. supra, April 
11, 1959, p. 48; The Urge To Sue, Time, Nov. 28, 1960, pp. 69, 70. A 
number of hospitals, for example, are said to have prohibited the use of 
spinal anesthetics, purportedly reacting to cases adjUdicating that physi-
cians employing their facilities were guilty of malpractice because of 
urifortunate results following the use of such anesthetics. (Silverman, 
ibid.) 
9When every patient is viewed largely as a potential plaintiff, the 
method of treatment chosen by the physician may well be that which 
appears easiest to justify in court rather than that which seems best from 
a purely medical standpoint. (See Siverson v. Weber, supra, 57 Ca1.2d at 
p. 839; Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Cali/Otrnia Medical Malpractice 
/,aw - Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point (1962) 14 Stan. 
L.Rev. ~51, 282.) The prohahle victim of such litigation-oriented medical 
practice is of course the patient, who suffers first when he receives less 
than t.he best available care, ancI second when the doctor whom he decides 
to sue understandahly appeals to the jury's inclination to protect a 
physician's professional standing. (See Fleming, Developments in thtJ 
English Law of Medical Liability (1959) 12 Vand.L.Rev. 633, 634.) 
1 USee generally 2 Harper and James, Torts (1956) § 19.6, p. 1081; Bee---
also id., §19.5, pp. 1080·1081 & fns. 16-18; §19.7, p. 1089 & fn. 11: 
Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital·Accident" Insurance: A Needed 
First Step Toward the Displacement of Liability for" Medical Malproo-
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concept of negligence as a prerequisite to medical liability 
now provides only sporadic and illusory protection for the 
physician. At the same time, insistence under all circum-
stances upon a nominal finding of fault frustrates the risk-
shifting purpose of the res ipsa doctrine as currently applied 
since it stands as an occasionally insuperable obstacle to the 
financial protection of inexplicably injured patients. 
A system openly imposing liability without any pretense of 
negligence in this narrow range of cases can avoid unwar-
ranted imputations of fault while permitting the rational 
development of badly needed doctrine. Simultaneously, such cL 
system can insure that the burdens of unexplained accidents 
will not fall primarily upon the helpless but will be borne 
instead by those best able to spread their cost among all who 
benefit from the surgical operations in which these misfor-
tunes occur.11 
. The record in this case supports the conclusion that the 
plaintiff's arthritic condition resulted from the premature 
termination of anesthesia, bringing the operation to an 
untimely halt. We deal here neither with a complication 
flowing from an undetectable idiosyncrasy of the patient 12 
nor with a risk which the patient voluntarily assumed in 
electing to undergo this type of surgery; we d(~[.d im,tead wilh 
a failure of the operation to accomplish the result that the 
patient, in light of her own physical condition, reasonably 
expected it to achieve.13 
tice" (1964) 31 U.ChLL.Rev. 279, 281-282 & fns. 8-9; Morris, Res Ipsa 
Loquitur - Liability Without Fault (1958) 25 Ins. Counsel J. 97. 
llSee Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra, passim; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on 
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts (1961) 70 Yale L.J. 499, 548· 
549; James, A.ccident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability 
Insurance (1948) 57 Yale L.J. 549, 550 & fn. 1, 553 & fn. 8; cf. Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 63-64 [27 Cal. 
Rptr. 687,377 P.2d 897]. 
12As the Chief Justice points out, expert testimony in this case sup-
ports the view that a certain number of patients are afflicted with a con· 
dition involving an overabundance of myelin surrounding their nerves. 
This rare condition, known as rachiresistance, apparently cannot be de-
tected in advance and either prevents the deposit of an adequate quantity 
of the anesthetizing agent on the patient'8 nerves 01' accelerates the rate 
at which the agent disappears. One of the defendants testified that the 
patient "had good and profound anesthesia for the prescribed time be-
. tore she did feel the pain" and that, for this reason, he concluded that 
the patient probably" detoxified faster than normal" because of rachi-
resistance. In light of the trial court's instl'Uctions and the jury's verdict, 
the jury evidently rejected this explanatioll, and I see no basis on which 
an appellate court could disturh the jury's conclusion in this regard. 
181 note in this connectioll that some courts have permitted injured 
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If this failure could have been traced to the anesthetic 
itself, or to some mechanical inadequacy in the' hospital 's 
surgical equipment, the plaintiff would not have been required 
to establish negligence as a prerequisite to recovery.14 The 
wholly fortuitous circumstance that this plaintiff's injury 
resulted instead from some undetermined mishap in the 
operating room should make no difference: in neither case 
should the patient's right to recover turn on her ability to 
isolate a negligent cause for her surgical injury. 
In such situations, the jury should be instructed that, if it 
finds that the plaintiff was injured in the course of an oper-
ation within the collective control of the defendants lCi and 
that this type of injury rarely occurs in such operations,16 
then it must return a verdict for the plaintiff unless the 
defendants establish that the injury resulted from an idio-
syncrasy of the patient17 or that the patient knowingly and 
voluntarily assumed the risk of incurring such an injury.18 
vate their malady. (See Recent Decisions (1962) 37 Notre Dame Law. 
725.) The transition from express to implied warranty, and thence to a 
legally imposed liability without fault, is too familiar to require detailed 
elucidation here. (See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 
Ca1.2d, 57, 61-63.) 
USee, 'e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 Ca1.2d 
57; see also Bowles v. Zimmer Manufacturing 00. (7th Oil'. 1960) 277 
F.2d 868, 874 (breach of warranty by manufacturer of surgical pin) ; ef. 
Note, The Medical Professio-n and Strict Liability for Defective Products 
-..4. Limited Extension (1965) 17 Hastings L.J. 359. 
15Compare Ybarra v. Spangard (1944) 25 Ca1.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 
162 A.L.R. 1258]. 
16Compare Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 154. 
Plaintiffs who suffer from injuries of a type which oommonly accompany 
a given medical procedure could of course proceed against defendants on 
an ordinary negligence theory. (See fn. 19, infra.) 
17Compare Prosser, TIle Fall oJ the Oitadel (Strict Liability to the 
Oonsumer) (1966) 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791, 810-811 & fns. 104·106. A doctor 
who knew or should have learned of the patient's peculiarity might 
theoretically be held liable if his negligence could be shown to have caused 
the injury. 
18Compare Farber v. Olkon (1953) 40 Ca1.2d 503, 511 [254 P.2d 520], 
in which we concluded that a malpractice plaintiff was not entitled to an 
instruction on res ipsa loquitur since undisputed testimony established 
that the bone fractures of which the plaintiff complained constituted" a 
calculated and even an expected risk of the [electro-shock] treatment." 
In determining which risks a patient may voluntarily assume in submit-
ting to a given medical procedure, the controlling consideration must of 
course be the reasonable expectations of the patient arising out of his 
relationship with the doctor, not the precise language of any prior agree-
ment or understanding. (See Tunkl v. Regents of University of Oalifornia 
(1963) 60 Ca1.2d 92 [32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 6 A.L.R.3d 693]; 
Darling v. Oharleston etc. Hospital (1965) 33 1l1.2d 326 [211 N.E.2d 
353]; ef. Gray v. Zurich Insurance 0'0. (1966) 65 Ca1.2d 263, 270·271 
[54 Cal.Rptr. 105, 419 P.2d 168].) 
-_ ... - ...... 
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Once the elusive and destructive search for an act or omis-
sion of "malpractice" has been restricted to those cases in 
which a negligent cause may actually be demonstrated,19 a 
far higher percentage of all medical controversies will be 
settled out of court, without the "economic and emotional 
strain of protracted litigation requiring difficult or impossible 
proof." (Ehrenzweig, op. cit., supra, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 
288.) In the relatively few cases which reach trial, the imposi-
tion of financial liability will not be aggravated by the 
ruinous consequences of a determination of malpractice unless 
the evidence points logically to such a finding. 
We should not impose the stigma of negligence upon a 
doctor merely because an operation yields an uncommon and 
inexplicable result; in the present state of the medical art,· the 
rarity of an event may well bear no relationship to negligenc('. 
Courts which ignore that fact in formulating the law of res 
ipsa loquitur unjustly penalize physicians and plunge the 
legal process into an abyss of uncertainty and obfuscation. 
Our proper concern for the financial protection of the patient 
gives us no warrant for faulting the doctor. 
I must conclude that, in this limited category of cases, the 
attempt to :fix liability exclusively in terms of traditional 
notions of fault has outlived its utility. Once it appears that 
an unexplained surgical accident has caused an unexpected 
injury, no useful end is advanced by rehearsing the ancient 
ritual of assessing blame. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I concur in the judgment under the 
compulsion of Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, 62 Ca1.2d 
154 [41 Cal.Rptr. 577, 397 P.2d 161J, but deem it appropriate 
to set forth why the evidence in this case, as in Quintal, does 
not justify a res ipsa loquitur instruction. 
A physician's duty is to exercise that degree of care and 
skill ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of his 
profession under similar circumstances. (Sinz v. Owens 
(1949) 33 Ca1.2d 749,753 [205 P.2d 3, 8 A.L.R.2d 757J.) He 
19Nothing in this opinion should be construed to suggest a change in 
the means by which a patient might prove actual negligence or in the 
defenses which a doctor might properly interpose to a negligence claim. 
Thus, for example, instructions on res ipsa loquitur would remain avail-
able when warranted by the evidence; there would no longer be any justi-
fication, however, for giving such instructions simply because rarity anll 
specific acts of negligence might both be present in a given case. (See 
fn. 2, supra.) A verdict predicated upon inferred negligence under a res 
ipsa instruction would henceforth be sustained only under the conditions 
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does not guarantee a cure. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
cannot properly be invoked to make him an insurer of the 
recovery of persons he treats. The Latin words cannot obliter. 
ate the fact that much of the functioning of the human body 
remains a mystery to medical science and that risks inherent 
in a given treatment may occur unexplainably though the 
treatment is administered skillfully. The occurren'ce of an 
injury that is a calculated risk of an approved course of 
conduct, standing alone, does not permit an inference of 
negligence. 
Such an inference must be based on more than speculation. 
If it is to be drawn from the happening of an accident, there 
must be common knowledge or expert testimony that when 
such an accident occurs, it is more probably than not the 
result of negligence. (Siverson v. Weber (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 834, 
836 [22 Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97]; Davis v. Memorial 
Hospital (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 815, 817 [26 Cal.Rptr. 633, 376 
P.2d 561] ; Cavero v. FrankUn General Benefit Soc. (1950) 36 
Ca1.2d 301, 309 [223 r.2d 471].) .A showing that such an 
accident rarely occurs does not justify an inference of negli-
gence without a further showing that when the rare event 
l1appens, it is more likely than not caused by negligence. 1 
(Siverson·v. Weber, supra; Seneris v. Haas (1956) 45 Ca1.2d 
811,824-826 [291 P.2d 915,53 A.L.R.2d 124].) 
Nor does evidence of specific acts of negligence justify an 
inference of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur, for the 
inferences the jury may reasonably draw from the happening 
of the accident alone obviously cannot be determined by evi. 
(lence of the defendant's conduct. 
There is no support in the record for a res ipsa loquitur 
jnstruction. Two unfortunate events combined to cause the 
injury, namely, the premature termination of anesthesia and 
the premature termination of surgery. The former was in the 
it l'Nt of Dr. Selmants' responsibility, the In tter in Dr. Gib. 
bons'. 
Although there is evidence that premature termination of 
anesthesia is unusual, there is no evidence that when it occurs 
it is more probably than not caused by negligence. On the 
('ontrary, there is a satisfactory medical explanation consis. 
tent wit.h due care. There is an inherent risk that a patient 
1" To permit an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur solely because an uncommon complication develops would place 
too great a burden upon the medical profession and might result in an 
undesirable limitation on the use of operations or new procedures involv-
ing an inherent risk of injury even when due care is used. Where risks 
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may have an excessive amount of myelin on his nerves. This 
condition cannot be detected in advance. It either prevents the 
deposit of an adequate quantity of the anesthetizing agent on 
the nerve or accelerates the rate at which it disappears. 
Physiological and pharmacological evidence indicated that it 
was such an overabundance of myelin that caused the prema-
ture termination of anesthesia in this case. 
Accordingly, there is no basis for an inference that prema-
ture termination of anesthesia is probably the result of negli-
gence. The hiatus in proof cannot logically be filled by 
invoking the rarity of the result and specific evidence of 
negligence. The facts that premature termination is rare, that 
plaintiff felt that she could not breathe and her voice became 
squeaky after anesthesia, and that defendants did not discuss' 
the anticipated duration of surgery shed no light on the ques-
tion whether premature termination of anesthesia is ordi-
narily caused by negligence. 2 
The record is likewise devoid of any evidence tllat prema-
tUre termination of surgery in cases of this kind is ordinarily 
the result of negligence. Indeed, there is not even evidence 
that such termination is rare. Although there is evidence that 
Dr. Gibbons was negligent in failing to consider the relevant 
factors before making his decision to terminate the operation, 
such evidence of specific negligence sheds no light on the 
inferences that may be drawn from the happening of the acci-
dent itself. 
The absence of any basis for invoking res ipsa loquitur 
against either defendant individually also forecloses invoking 
it against them jointly under Ybarra v. Spangard (1945) 25 
Ca1.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258]. The Ybarra case 
involved an accident that was clearly the result of someone's 
negligence, and the court imposed a burden of explanation 
upon all the defendants who had assumed control of the 
unconscious plaintiff. That case cannot reasonably be invoked 
when the accident itself affords no evidence of negligence. 
are inherent in an operation and an injury of a type which is rare does 
occur, the doctrine should not be applicable unless it can be said that, in 
the light of past experience, such an occurrence is more likely the result 
of negligence than some cause for which defendant is not responsible." 
(Siverson v. Weber, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 834, 839.) 
2The majority opinion mentions that Dr. Sclmants did not note in his 
operative report that the surgery was not completed, and that Dr. Gibbons 
charged plaintiff less than llis usual fee and his partner offered to fuse 
the ankle for a token fee. Whatever remote relevance these facts might 
have, they add nothing to a determination of the inferences that may rea-
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The expansion of res ipsa loquitur undertaken in Quintal 
places too great a burden on the medical profession and may 
result in an Undesirable limitation on the use of procedures 
involving inherent risks of injury even when due care is used. 
(Siverson v; Weber, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 834.) An anesthesiolo-
gist and a surgeon, confronted with one of the inherent risks . 
of an operation not susceptible to advance calculation, may be 
found liable for any unfortunate consequence. In planning a 
course of action they may therefore feel compelled to consider 
not simply the best interests of the patient but the procedure 
that will be most readily justified to a lay jury. 
The essence of Quintal is restated in the majority opinion, 
which first discredits rarity alone as a basis for re~ ipsa, but 
then states: "The likelihood of a negligent cause is increased 
if the low incidence of accidents when due care is used is 
combined with proof of specific acts of negligence of a type 
which would have caused the occurrence complained of. When 
these two facts are proved, the likelihood of a negligent cause 
may be sufficiently great that the jury may properly conclude 
that the accident was more probably than not the result of 
someone's negligence." That statement might be appropriate 
for counsel to make in arguing to the jury that it could infer 
from evidence of defendants' negligent conduct that such 
conduct caused the injury. It has no relation, however, to res 
ipsa loquitur, which involves the inferences that may be 
drawn from the mere happening of the accident. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgment for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Pierce in the 
opinion prepared by him for the Court of Appeal in Clark v. 
Gibbons (Cal.App.) 50 Cal.Rptr. 127. 
Appellants' petitions for a rehearing were denied May 17, 
1967. Traynor, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that 
the petitions should be granted. 
